There is a particular kind of European policy that deserves its own entry in the taxonomy of political self-deception: the decision so righteous in intention, and so costly in consequence, that its authors begin treating the consequences as proof of the righteousness. Europe's treatment of oil and gas investment over the past decade is a compelling case study. Between roughly 2015 and 2022, the continent's governments, development banks, pension funds and regulators competed with one another to demonstrate who could starve the hydrocarbon sector fastest — divesting, banning, taxing, restricting, moralising. It was, by any honest reading, a resounding success. European capital largely vacated oil and gas.
And in vacating it, Europe did something extraordinary: it made everyone else viable. The American liquefaction engineer, the Qatari emir, the Norwegian pipeline bureaucrat, the Greek shipowner, the commodity trader in Geneva — all of them are living, in 2026, inside a structural windfall that European abstention built. The continent chose to be virtuous and short, and discovered — as markets eventually teach — that abstention is a position too. Europe went short its own energy security and long someone else's margin. The P&L on that trade is the subject of this essay.
Chapter One: The Great Un-Investment
Begin with the doctrine. In May 2021, the International Energy Agency published its Net Zero by 2050 roadmap, declaring that beyond projects already committed there should be no new oil and gas fields approved for development — "no need for investment in new fossil fuel supply" at all. This was not some fringe manifesto; it was the energy establishment's Vatican, and European capital treated it as papal instruction.
The machinery of abstention then swung into action with Germanic efficiency:
- The European Investment Bank — the EU's lending arm — stopped financing fossil fuel projects from 2021, with a de facto blanket ban kicking in by 2022. The public bank of a continent that imports ~90% of its gas refused to finance gas.
- Pension funds and asset owners, from Dutch giants to British university endowments, ran divestment programmes that sold oil and gas equities by the billion. Glasgow's COP26 assembled the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero — some $130 trillion of assets pledging alignment with net zero.
- Governments layered on the finishing touches: fracking bans across most of Western Europe (despite sitting on meaningful shale geology, particularly in Britain, Poland and France), punitive windfall taxes on North Sea producers that accelerated the field-decline curve, planning regimes that made new exploration about as welcome as a cigarette machine in an oncology ward, and — in Germany's case, the masterstroke — the simultaneous closure of nuclear power plants, which removed the only large-scale dispatchable low-carbon backstop and locked gas into the generation mix for decades.
The intellectual error at the heart of all this was not climate concern. It was the conflation of demand policy with supply policy. Europe decided it would not produce hydrocarbons, while declining to ask whether the rest of the world might politely decline to consume them. It is as if a man resolved never to own a restaurant and assumed he would therefore never be hungry. The distinction matters: reducing demand can be a coherent climate strategy; constraining supply faster than alternatives can be built is a different proposition, with rather different consequences.
Chapter Two: The Bill Arrives — and the War Gets the Blame It Doesn't Deserve
Here a clarification is required, because the conventional narrative is lazily wrong. It is fashionable in Brussels — and in much of the press — to blame the war. Wars make excellent culprits: they cannot sue for defamation, and they conveniently absolve everyone who wrote the regulations. But let us be precise. Russia's invasion of Ukraine did not create Europe's energy vulnerability, though it dramatically intensified it. It stress-tested weaknesses accumulated over years — the way an earthquake does not build a badly engineered tower, but reveals which walls were load-bearing and which were merely painted to look the part.
The earthquake metaphor matters, because Europe's exposure was already substantial before February 2022. No single policy explains it: declining indigenous production, reliance on Russian pipeline gas, uneven infrastructure, investment uncertainty and choices about nuclear power all contributed. But a continent that:
- 1. refuses to drill its own substantial gas reserves,
- 2. refuses to frack even as America fracked its way to energy independence and cheap molecules,
- 3. closes its nuclear plants while calling gas a "bridge fuel",
- 4. lets its own banks and pension funds legislate themselves out of the sector,
...has not been attacked by a war. It has been caught by one. The war exposed the decisions; the decisions built the exposure. The 2026 sequel — a Middle East conflict disrupting Hormuz and sharply repricing European gas — illustrates the point. Each geopolitical tremor finds Europe exposed to risks that are different in geography but familiar in structure. The response to the first crisis was necessarily to secure replacement supplies quickly; the longer-term question is whether Europe has done enough to build resilience at home, rather than simply buying its vulnerability from further away.
With that said, the invoice itself. In August 2022, Dutch TTF gas — the continent's benchmark — peaked at around €340 per megawatt-hour, roughly fifteen to twenty times the pre-crisis norm, having traded in the teens and low twenties for years. At €340/MWh, the price bankrupts fertiliser plants, aluminium smelters, and governments that try to shield both simultaneously.
What followed was the largest forced re-routing of energy flows in modern history:
- Russian pipeline gas to the EU collapsed from around 40% of pipeline imports in 2021 to about 6% in 2025.
- Europe scrambled for liquefied natural gas, and LNG's share of demand jumped from below 20% to nearly 45% — moving the continent off a fixed pipe and onto the global spot market, where Asia, Latin America and Europe now bid against each other for every cargo.
- Between 2022 and 2025, EU countries spent approximately €404 billion on pipeline gas imports alone — about €177 billion of it to Norway, €80 billion to Russia (even during the war years, via Türkiye), and the balance to Algeria, Azerbaijan and others.
Even the demand destruction was, in significant part, involuntary. EU gas consumption did fall — by over 19% between 2021 and 2024 — reflecting a mixture of efficiency, fuel-switching, milder weather and reduced industrial activity. Some energy-intensive production, including fertiliser, chemicals, steel and glass, contracted or moved to regions with cheaper energy. Where production is displaced rather than genuinely decarbonised, Europe risks reducing emissions within its own borders while importing goods whose production carries emissions elsewhere. One might call this carbon leakage; the less charitable call it accountancy with extra steps.
And here is the detail that should be embroidered on the pillow of every Brussels strategist: even after the crisis, even after the moral awakening, the EU still spent an estimated €7.2 billion on Russian LNG in 2025 — up from €6.3 billion in 2024 — plus a further €5.9 billion on Russian pipeline gas, because TurkStream kept humming through the Balkans. Virtue, it turns out, has a baseload requirement.
Chapter Three: Who Became Viable
Now the counterparty side of the trade — the people for whom European abstention was, quietly, the greatest subsidy scheme in energy history.
The United States. In 2021, the US supplied the EU with 18.9 bcm of gas. In 2025, it supplied 75.6 bcm — a fourfold increase in four years, nearly 58% of the EU's LNG. IEEFA expects the US to overtake Norway as the bloc's single largest gas supplier in 2026. Washington did not plan this windfall. Europe delivered it, gift-wrapped in the language of moral necessity, at an estimated €28 billion in 2025 alone.
Norway. Oslo, bless its consistency, never joined the divestment theology. While Europe's funds sold hydrocarbons on principle, Norway's sovereign wealth fund — built entirely from hydrocarbons — kept collecting. Norway supplied 89.3 bcm in 2025, about 31% of imports, and pocketed roughly €177 billion from EU pipeline purchases between 2022 and 2025. The continent that would not drill its own North Sea paid the continent that did, at crisis prices, to drill theirs. There is a word for this in commodity trading. It is not "strategy."
Qatar and the Gulf — until the music stopped. Europe courted Doha with long-term contracts, helping underwrite massive liquefaction expansion. Then, in the 2026 US–Iran conflict, the Strait of Hormuz effectively closed to Qatari and Emirati cargoes, knocking out roughly a fifth of global LNG supply at a stroke and forcing Asian buyers to backfill from the Atlantic basin. TTF touched €100/MWh in late October 2026 — the first time since December 2022 — with EU storage at ~75% and Germany's at ~60% against a five-year average of 90%. EU governments had already spent €17.9 billion in 2026 cushioning households and industry. Europe diversified away from one chokepoint by buying from another, and discovered the sea lanes have chokepoints of their own. Cartographers could have told them. Cartographers were not consulted.
The traders. Vitol, Trafigura, Gunvor and their peers posted record or near-record results through the crisis years — and in 2026, with the Atlantic–Pacific arbitrage re-opened by the Hormuz disruption and extraordinary volatility in TTF (which in November 2026 still trades ~157% above its level a year earlier), the optionality embedded in European panic is once again being monetised at industrial scale. Europe built the most volatile gas market in history and then acted surprised that volatility traders made money.
The shipowners — my own profession's guilty pleasure. Europe's pivot from pipelines to LNG turned gas transport from a fixed tube under the Baltic into a floating logistics business of staggering intensity:
- November 2022: spot charter rates for modern LNG carriers surpassed $424,000 per day.
- 2025: the largest ordering programme in industry history produced a glut so severe that spot rates collapsed to around $5,000 per day — below operating cost.
- November 2025: within months, Atlantic spot rates were back above $100,000 per day.
- 2026: with Qatari cargoes blocked at Hormuz and Asian buyers pulling Atlantic supply east, tonne-mile demand surged again; more than 170 further newbuilds are due in 2026–27.
This is not a market. It is a trampoline. And the trampoline exists in part because Europe — a continent with significant offshore resources, technical expertise and capital — has struggled to translate those advantages into a durable domestic supply strategy. Shale potential is not the same thing as commercially recoverable, politically acceptable production; nor can North Sea output simply be switched on at will. But neither constraint makes the case for treating domestic supply as an afterthought. Europe elected to import more of its molecules from far away and then complained, with some justification, about the freight bill. Every LNG carrier ordered in the post-2022 frenzy is, in a sense, a monument to a European policy decision. The shipyards thank Brussels for the orders.
Chapter Four: The 2026 Punchline
The final irony is unfolding in real time. The EU's REPower Gas Regulation entered into force with great ceremony, banning Russian imports in stages through November 2027. And what happened in the first months of the ban? Russian LNG imports rose 17% between March and May 2026 versus the same period of 2025; pipeline imports rose 5%. Russian gas still covers around 12% of EU demand, with authorised contracts for 45–55 bcm per year still in force. Europe legislated against its own dependency the way one legislates against the tide: formally, and with full press coverage.
The deeper lesson is structural. A continent cannot indefinitely constrain domestic gas production, rule out shale development, reduce firm nuclear capacity, miss demand-reduction targets — EU consumption in 2025 ran above both the Fit-for-55 and REPowerEU paths, according to the figures cited here — and expect to avoid becoming a price-taker with a storage problem. The relative contribution of each choice is debatable; their combined effect on resilience is not. The reward is a €100/MWh winter, deindustrialisation dressed as virtue, and a continent that has converted a pipeline dependency on one adversary into an LNG dependency on the most volatile shipping corridor on earth. Diversification, in Brussels dialect, means different risk, not less.
Chapter Five: What Would Actually Fix It
Criticism without a remedy is merely grumbling in a suit, so let us put one on. The solutions are unglamorous, which is precisely why Brussels has avoided them: they involve drilling, storing, and buying like professionals rather than penitents.
1. Produce at home — gas is a transition asset, not a sin. Reverse the regulatory hostility to domestic production: a stable, predictable fiscal regime for the North Sea instead of windfall taxes that accelerate decommissioning; an honest, evidence-based assessment of shale (the "earthquakes and poisoned aquifers" case has been rather overtaken by two decades of American data); and — non-negotiable — keep and extend the nuclear fleet, the only proven route to firm low-carbon power at scale. Every bcm produced in Europe is a bcm not bought on the spot market at the moment of maximum panic, and not shipped through a strait with a war on.
2. Storage as strategic reserve, not market afterthought. Raise the storage obligation to a binding 90% by 1 November with swingeing penalties for shortfall, and create a genuine European strategic gas reserve — the gas equivalent of America's petroleum reserve — financed jointly and held outside the commercial market. The 2026 winter, entered with German storage at ~60% against a 90% norm, demonstrates what happens when storage is treated as an accounting convention rather than a weapon.
3. Buy like a professional, not a panicked tourist. AggregateEU, the joint purchasing platform, is the right instinct executed with amateur pricing discipline. Europe should negotiate LNG contracts the way Japan and Korea do: long-term, staggered, destination-flexible, from a genuinely diversified slate (US, Qatar, Norway, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Mozambique, Canada), with the explicit objective of never again being the marginal buyer of last resort at the winter peak. Hire traders — real ones — and give them the mandate Europe's treasury officials conspicuously lack: buy when it's cheap, not when it's on fire.
4. Fix the market design that rewarded the panic. Position limits on TTF financial positions, circuit breakers, and a wider family of transparent LNG price benchmarks would drain some of the speculative froth from a market that has become a casino with a flag. Volatility is a trader's friend; it should not be a continent's energy policy.
5. Build logistics redundancy — and stop swapping one chokepoint for another. The regas terminals rushed up after 2022 (Wilhelmshaven, Brunsbüttel and their sisters) were necessary; now finish the job with interconnectors that let molecules move south and east, and consciously architect supply routes that do not all funnel through either the Danish straits or Hormuz. Dependence on a single maritime corridor is dependence, whatever language the tanker speaks.
6. Demand honesty: meet the targets or stop citing them. The Fit-for-55 and REPowerEU demand paths exist; Europe keeps missing them and keeps citing them, which is the policy equivalent of citing a gym membership as evidence of fitness. Electrify heating where it is economical (heat pumps, district heating), build genuine industrial demand-response markets so factories become flexible rather than extinct, and enforce the carbon border adjustment properly so that "decarbonisation" stops meaning "exporting the smokestack to Shanxi and importing the steel back."
7. Un-handcuff the capital. The EIB should carve out an explicit security-of-supply exception for gas storage, interconnectors and abated domestic production — infrastructure, not exploration lotteries. Europe's pension funds should be freed of mandatory divestment mandates and allowed, within fiduciary duty, to invest in energy security. Capital did not fail Europe; Europe's instructions to capital failed Europe. Change the instructions.
8. Sequence the virtue. The Russian phase-out is morally defensible and strategically right — but it must be sequenced behind replacement capacity that is physically, contractually online, not merely announced at a summit. A ban that comes into force while imports rise by 17% is not a phase-out. It is a press release with a compliance problem.
None of this is exotic. It is, in different combinations, the energy policy of countries that take security of supply seriously — including those currently selling Europe its gas. America drills, stores, contracts long and maintains a strategic reserve. Norway drills. Qatar drills and contracts. Europe, too, has built terminals, diversified routes and introduced joint purchasing; the criticism is that these measures have not yet amounted to a coherent, durable security-of-supply doctrine. Which brings us, at last, to the Romans.
Coda: Faber Est Suae Quisque Fortunae
Sallust got there first: faber est suae quisque fortunae — each man is the maker of his own fortune. It is a sentence Brussels should have carved above every commission door, preferably before 2021.
Markets abhor a vacuum the way nature does. When Europe's capital exited oil and gas — morally triumphant, numerically certain, geologically indifferent — it did not abolish the molecules. It simply re-priced them, re-routed them, and re-allocated the margin. The American exporter became viable at scale. The Norwegian state became richer than its own doctrine allows it to admit. The Qatari expansion found a desperate buyer. The trader found an arbitrage. The shipowner found a tonne-mile. Every one of them owes a debt of gratitude to the European policymaker who looked at a gas field and saw only a sin, rather than a supply curve.
The economist's verdict is old and unfashionable: security of supply is manufactured, not declared. You build it with pipes, wells, ships and — yes — capital, deployed unglamorously and in advance, years before it is needed. You do not build it by divesting, banning and moralising, and then buying the resulting shortage from whoever had the impertinence to keep drilling.
The war exposed the wound, but Europe's own decisions inflicted it. And the repair, like the damage, will be made at home — in committee rooms less grand than Brussels' summits, in drilling permits, storage caverns and long-term contracts, in the unphotogenic business of producing, storing and buying energy like a serious continent. Europe's past decisions did not make Europe viable. They made everyone else viable. Faber est suae quisque fortunae — the fortune is Europe's to remake, if it can be persuaded to pick up the tools.
Sources: IEA Net Zero by 2050 (2021); European Investment Bank policy (2021–22); ACER Russian Gas Phase-Out Reports (2026); European Commission / Council of the EU (2025–26); IEEFA EU Gas Flows Tracker (2026); Bruegel; RTE; Trading Economics; Spark Commodities; Lloyd's List; Vortexa; Timera Energy. Figures as reported at the time of writing, November 2026.
Hero image: Unsplash (free licence, no attribution required — though a credit line is always decent form).
(The views expressed are the author's own and do not constitute investment advice.)